Diplomacy, inspections, and targeted sanctions should be exhausted before conventional military force is used. In other words, targeted sanctions focus on leaders, firms, or sectors rather than broadly restricting an entire population.

Arms sales should end when an allied government repeatedly uses the weapons against civilians. In other words, arms transfers can include sales, grants, maintenance, ammunition, and technical support.

Military conscription should be reserved for defense against a direct and severe threat to the country. In other words, conscription requires eligible people to perform military service.

A treaty ally that is invaded should be defended militarily even when doing so creates serious costs and escalation risks. In other words, collective-defense treaties commit members to assist one another after an attack.

Limited military strikes can be justified to stop an imminent mass killing when no effective peaceful option remains. In other words, a limited strike uses force for a narrow objective rather than broader regime change or occupation.

A credible nuclear deterrent should be maintained as long as rival states possess nuclear weapons. In other words, the country would keep nuclear weapons capable of surviving an attack and striking back so rivals expect aggression to be met with devastating retaliation.

A major state-sponsored cyberattack on critical infrastructure may justify proportionate offensive retaliation. In other words, after reliable attribution, the country could use a limited cyber, economic, or military response matched to the scale of the attack.

A country should join a mutual-defense alliance that obligates it to fight if any member is attacked. In other words, a mutual-defense clause creates a standing obligation rather than a case-by-case promise.

Instead of overseas military action, government should rely on expanded domestic screening and surveillance to prevent attacks. In other words, the strategy avoids military force but accepts broader coercive prevention within the country.

After a nuclear attack on an ally, leaders should seek a ceasefire and use nonnuclear responses rather than retaliate with nuclear weapons. In other words, avoiding further nuclear escalation should take priority even when an alliance partner has suffered a devastating attack.

A country should be willing to use nuclear weapons first when conventional defeat would otherwise threaten its survival as an independent state. In other words, nuclear first use can be justified as a last resort even when the adversary has not yet used nuclear weapons.