Elected legislatures, not courts, should normally have the final word on contested social policy. In other words, on disputed social policy, courts would generally leave the final decision to elected lawmakers unless the constitution clearly requires otherwise.

A constitution should be amendable through two successive national majority votes without requiring a supermajority. In other words, a supermajority requires more than half, such as two-thirds, to approve a change.

A national referendum should be able to reverse a policy created by judicial interpretation when voters clearly reject it. In other words, voters could use a formally authorized national vote to reverse a rule that arose from a court's interpretation.

Election rules may be changed by an elected majority after public debate rather than being insulated from ordinary politics. In other words, election law would remain changeable through the ordinary democratic process rather than requiring a commission, supermajority, or constitutional amendment.

Courts should invalidate a popular law that denies equal civil rights to a religious or ethnic minority. In other words, constitutional invalidation prevents enforcement even when the law was democratically enacted.

Suspending core civil liberties during an emergency should require a legislative supermajority and prompt judicial review. In other words, prompt review requires courts to assess legality during, not only after, the emergency.

Independent election-administration rules should be protected from unilateral change by the party currently in power. In other words, the governing party could not change election-administration rules by itself through an ordinary majority vote.

Fundamental constitutional amendments should require broader and more durable agreement than a single election majority. In other words, broader agreement may require supermajorities, regional consent, or approval across multiple elections.

A constitutional court may replace a voter-approved mandatory prison sentence with a restorative sentence when proportionality review finds the punishment excessive for the offense. In other words, the court would find the mandatory punishment excessively harsh for the offense and substitute a sentence focused more on repair and rehabilitation.

A legislative majority should be able to delegate narrow, temporary emergency powers to an expert agency and bar courts from reviewing the agency's individual decisions during that period. In other words, lawmakers could temporarily give specialists final authority over individual emergency decisions and prevent immediate court review of those decisions.

A democratic majority should be able to authorize race-conscious university admissions even when courts interpret general equal-treatment guarantees to forbid them. In other words, elected majorities should usually decide whether public universities may consider race rather than judges deriving a nationwide ban from broad equality language.