A country should retain an independent currency rather than join a monetary union that transfers interest-rate policy to a shared central bank and includes common fiscal rules. In other words, joining the union would move routine interest-rate decisions to a shared central bank and would also require compliance with agreed limits on national budgeting.

National food-safety rules should not be weakened merely because an international trade tribunal considers them a barrier to commerce. In other words, a trade body should not force a country to weaken a safety rule merely because the rule makes imported goods harder to sell.

Foreign purchases of strategically important infrastructure should be subject to national-security screening even when treaties favor open investment. In other words, the government would review foreign purchases of ports, power systems, communications networks, or similar assets for security risks.

A government should be able to withdraw from a treaty when its voters reject the continuing obligations. In other words, treaties often include withdrawal procedures and notice periods.

Countries should accept a common minimum corporate-tax floor to reduce profit shifting between jurisdictions. In other words, a minimum corporate-tax floor reduces incentives to book profits in very low-tax jurisdictions.

Member states in a regional union should share responsibility for asylum claims according to population and capacity. In other words, countries in the union would divide responsibility for asylum seekers using a common formula based on population and available resources.

Cross-border supply chains should be subject to enforceable international labor standards. In other words, enforceable standards may use inspections, complaints, trade consequences, or corporate liability.

Countries should accept binding international rules for reporting dangerous disease outbreaks and sharing pathogen data. In other words, pathogen data can support diagnosis, vaccines, and outbreak tracking but may carry economic or security concerns.

A state or province should be allowed to join an international climate compact even when the national government objects. In other words, a subnational government could enter a formal cross-border climate agreement even though the national government opposes it.

Regions should be free to reject an international agreement adopted by the national government when the agreement intrudes on local authority. In other words, a region could decline to carry out a national government's international commitment when that commitment overrides powers normally reserved to the region.

A regional union should allocate asylum seekers among member states by capacity and need, even when voters in one state want to prioritize co-nationals. In other words, the union would use one transparent formula to place asylum seekers according to capacity and vulnerability rather than national preference.

A country should launch a limited unilateral strike against an imminent external threat even when international institutions refuse authorization. In other words, unilateral force is undertaken without authorization from a treaty body, regional organization, or the United Nations.

A country with functioning independent courts should not allow an international criminal court to prosecute its citizens without national consent. In other words, final criminal authority over citizens should remain with the country’s own legal system rather than an external court.

Countries should accept binding international prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity even when national leaders object. In other words, an independent international court should be able to prosecute the gravest offenses when national power would otherwise block accountability.